Probabilistic model checking is a technique for verifying whether a model such as a Markov chain satisfies a probabilistic, behavioral property -e.g. ''with probability at least 0.999, a device will be elected leader''. Such properties are expressible in probabilistic temporal logics, e.g. PCTL, and efficient algorithms exist for checking whether these formulae are true or false on finite-state models.
Introduction
Countable labeled Markov chains [1, 2] are an important class of stochastic processes for the modeling of probabilistic systems. Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) [3] is a probabilistic temporal logic whose formulae φ can express practically relevant specifications, e.g. ''with probability at least 0.999, a device will be elected leader'' -a requirement within a telecommunications standard such as [4] Efficient algorithms exist that compute, over a finite-state labeled Markov chain, the set of states that satisfy a given PCTL formula (e.g. the ones implemented in the probabilistic model checker PRISM [5] ). A specifier, however, may need more information than just knowledge of that set. The specifier may want to understand why a particular state or set of states of interest is in that set, and any such information may be seen as evidence or diagnostics of truth. Equally, the specifier may be interested in comprehending why a particular state is not in that set, and any such information would now be evidence for falsity.
For example, Verifier needs to make choices for existential quantifiers in configurations of form M, ∃xψ, V , and for conjunctions in configurations of form M, ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 , R . A strategy σ is winning for a player if all plays played according to the choices offered by strategy σ are won by that player. Since all plays for first-order logic are finite, classical game theory guarantees that games G(M, φ) are determined: exactly one of the two players has a winning strategy for that game.
It is well known that in ordinary set theory ZF the assumption of the Axiom of Choice is equivalent to that (Correspondence) ''Verifier wins game G(M, φ) if, and only if, predicate M | φ holds''.
holds. So one gets an operational and ''small-step'' account of truth in first-order logic from the Axiom of Choice.
Our Hintikka games for PCTL retain the above idea: Verifier and Refuter are adversarial players. A configuration in the game corresponds to a location in the Markov chain (replacing the structure), the formula to be proven for this location, and the player whose role is to prove it. The choices of sub-formulae are similar to the choices in the case of first-order logic described above. The choices of structural elements turn out to be sub-distributions that approximate transition distributions in labeled Markov chains. Structural choices prove the truth of temporal formulae, such as [pUq] ≥0.999 . Such formulae can be either proven or refuted immediately by proving q or refuting p. If this is impossible to do immediately, the player who is trying to prove this formula suggests how to partition the obligation ≥0.999 between the successors of a state in a way that matches transitions in the underlying Markov chain. The opponent then chooses with which successor to continue the game and the probability of pUq is adjusted according to the promised obligation and the transition probability. Unlike the case of first-order logic, our plays may be infinite and infinite plays are won according to the configurations that appear infinitely often.
We here also rely on the Axiom of Choice in proving (Correspondence) in our setting of PCTL and countable labeled Markov chains. This dependency appears to vanish for finite-state models and for PCTL formulae whose threshold types and controlling player satisfy simple consistency conditions developed in this paper. The latter is of interest since any PCTL formula can be rewritten with the help of small perturbations of thresholds that will not diminish their practical value to specifiers but that establishes, in some cases, the said consistency conditions. For example, formulae [ttUsomeLeaderElected] ≥0.999 and [ttUsomeLeaderElected] >p with p = 0.999 − 10 −15 have different threshold types (≥ versus >) but the latter formula may in practice be considered a valid substitute for the former one.
Outline of the paper. In Section 2, we review the familiar denotational semantics of PCTL for countable labeled Markov chains as models, and prove a finite-state approximation lemma for (Strong) Until formulae with non-strict thresholds under that semantics. In Section 3, the game semantics for PCTL over countable labeled Markov chains is being defined and these games are shown to be determined and to capture precisely the denotational semantics of PCTL. In Section 4, we discuss what structural properties one may assume in winning strategies for our games. A discussion of the relevance of our results to finding finite representations of winning strategies is contained in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss related work, and we conclude in Section 7.
Preliminaries
(Countable) Labeled Markov chains M over a set of atomic propositions AP are triples (S, P, L), where S is a countable set of states, P: S × S → [0, 1] is a countable stochastic matrix such that the countable sum of non-negative reals s ∈S P(s, s ) converges to 1 for all s ∈ S, and L: AP → P(S) is a labeling function where L(q) is the set of states at which atomic proposition q is true. We say that M is finitely branching iff for all s ∈ S the set {s ∈ S | P(s, s ) > 0} is finite. A path π from state s in M is an infinite sequence of states s 0 s 1 . . . with s 0 = s and P(s i , s i+1 ) > 0 for all i ≥ 0. For Y ⊆ S, we write P(s, Y ) as a shorthand for the (possibly infinite but well defined) sum s ∈Y P(s, s ).
The syntax of PCTL is given in Fig. 1 . Path formulae α are wrapping PCTL formulae into ''LTL'' operators for Next, (Strong) Until, and Weak Until familiar from linear-time temporal logic [7] . Until formulae φU ≤k ψ are Strong Untils since paths that satisfy such a formula have to maintain temporary invariant φ until they reach a state satisfying ψ, and such a state has to be reached within finite transitions, and also within k transitions if k = ∞. Weak Until formulae φW ≤k ψ are Weak Untils since reaching a state satisfying ψ is optional if φ is an invariant on the path s 0 s 1 . . . s k , which is understood to be the full path π when k = ∞. The value k = ∞ is being used to express unbounded Untils, whereas k ∈ N expresses a proper step bound on Untils. We write φUψ as a shorthand for φU ≤∞ ψ, and φWψ as shorthand for φW ≤∞ ψ. Path formulae α are interpreted as predicates π | α over paths π of M. PCTL formulae φ are interpreted as subsets [|φ|] M of S. The semantics of path and PCTL formulae is the standard one, given in Fig. 2 . The measure space of path sets is generated from cylinder path sets in the standard fashion [1] . We thus write Prob M (s, α) for the probability of the measurable set Path M (s, α) of paths π = s . . . with π | α. PCTL formulae wrap path formulae with probability thresholds (turning predicates on paths into predicates on states), interpret atoms according to the labeling function L, and interpret negation and conjunction as complement and intersection of predicates (respectively). The operators φ ∨ψ (disjunction) and φ → ψ (implication) are derived as ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ) and ¬φ ∨ ψ, respectively. Let ff be an abbreviation for any [ We now state and prove a finite-state approximation lemma for the validity of Until formulae with non-strict probability thresholds at states of labeled Markov chains. This lemma will be crucial in proving that our game semantics of PCTL, developed in Section 3, captures exactly the denotational semantics in Fig. 2 .
Definition 1 (Finite Unfoldings).
Let M = (S, P, L) be a labeled Markov chain. For each i ∈ N and s 0 ∈ S we define the labeled Markov chain M
, a random tree with root s 0 : unfold M from s 0 as a full tree of depth i, where edges have positive probability according to P. This may duplicate states but such duplicates will satisfy the same atomic propositions. States at level i have a self-loop with probability 1. The probability measures P(s, ·) at levels < i are those in M. For each j ∈ N we restrict M s 0 i to the finitely branching, and so finite-state, labeled Markov chain M
with one additional state t sink which satisfies tt but no other q ∈ AP: For each s ∈ S i , let t 1 , t 2 , . . . be an enumeration of 
follows by the monotonicity of the denotational semantics for ''GreaterThan'' thresholds. Fig. 3 the probability of qUr at s 0 is 4 9 so for every n < 18 we have
3 the probability of qUr at s 0 is 13 27 and so for every n < 54 we have
. Lemma 1 promises a similar approximation for every (countable) labeled Markov chain.
Lemma 1 has a dual version, required in the proof of Theorem 2 below.
Corollary 1. For labeled Markov chain
M = (S, P, L), q, r ∈ AP, and p ∈ [0, 1]: s ∈ [|[qWr] >p |] M iff for all n ∈ N there are k, l ∈ N with s ∈ [|[qWr] ≥p+1/n |] M s k,l . Proof of Corollary 1. s ∈ [|[qWr] >p |] M iff s ∈ [|[¬rU(¬q ∧ ¬r)] ≥1−p |] M , as qWr ≡ ¬(¬rU(¬q ∧ ¬r)). By Lemma 1, for all n ∈ N there are k, l ∈ N with s ∈ [|[¬rU(¬q ∧ ¬r)] ≥1−p−1/n |] M s k,l . Thus, s ∈ [|[qWr] >p+1/n |] M s k,l .
Game semantics
Let M = (S, P, L) be a labeled Markov chain over the set of atomic propositions AP. For each state s ∈ S and PCTL formula φ we define a 2-person Hintikka game G M (s, φ). As already mentioned, these games are played between two players V (the Verifier) and R (the Refuter). As before, we let !V = R and !R = V.
After having defined these games and their winning conditions, we show that each game G M (s, φ) is won by player V iff s ∈ [|φ|] M ; and won by player R iff s ∈ [|φ|] M . In particular, each game G M (s, φ) is determined, exactly one of the players V and R wins that game. The game G M (s, φ) has as set of configurations
where we define the set of PCTL formulae cl(φ), the closure of φ, in Fig. 4 . This set merely delineates the universe of PCTL formulae ψ such that all configurations t, ψ, C reachable in game G M (s, φ) satisfy ψ ∈ cl(φ). Set cl 1 (φ) is part of the closure as familiar from first-order logic. Set cl 2 (φ) is specific to PCTL and will be discussed implicitly in game moves for clause Path Probability of PCTL. The intuition behind a configuration t, ψ, C is that player C claims (or has the burden of proof) that ψ holds in state t. The intuition behind the moves is as follows. In move M1, any formula [α] >1 is made semantically equivalent to ff whereas move M2 encodes that any formula [α] ≥0 is semantically equivalent to tt. In move M3, the winner of configurations s, q, C is determined according to whether atom q is true at state s. The moves M4 and M5 are basically those familiar from first-order logic for negation and conjunction (respectively). In order to handle more complex operators we have to devise more complex moves. In games for branching-time logics such as CTL or the µ-calculus (see e.g. [8] ), the universal quantification in ∀Xψ (''at all next states, ψ holds'') is resolved by Refuter's choice of a successor state; and the existential quantification in ∃Xψ (''at some next state, ψ holds'') is resolved by
Verifier supplying one successor state, both as familiar from the case of quantifiers in first-order logic. For the next operator in PCTL, however, things are more complicated as reflected in move M6. The next operator [Xφ] p says that φ holds with This leaves us with explaining and motivating the moves in the case that α is Weak or Strong Until. In qualitative games, Until operators are resolved by using the logical equivalence qUr ≡ r ∨(q∧X(qUr))-and similarly for Weak Until operators.
The only problem in adopting this for PCTL is in the possibility of deferring promises forever. For games in qualitative settings this is typically handled by fairness, but for PCTL fairness is not strong enough: does not hold at s 0 but allowing Verifier to delay promises forever may be unsound, e.g., Verifier could supply the promise 1/3 immediately, promising more than 1/6 in the future, and then -by deferring the promise indefinitely -Verifier could win
).
Please cite this article in press as: H. To address this problem we add a special -move as well as acceptance conditions for infinite plays. If the probability is at least p, player C (who claims this) should be able to prove that it is greater than p − for every > 0. On the other hand, if the probability is strictly less than p then there exists an for which it is less than p − ; and player !C does not lose ground by giving up an . Thus, player !C chooses the and player C proves in finite time (appealing to Lemma 1) that she can get as close as needed to the bound. The same intuition (but dual) works for Weak Until, when the Weak Until formula in question does not hold. This follows from the semantic equivalence ¬(φUψ) ≡ (¬ψ)W(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ) of path formulae. In move M7, player !C makes such an = 1/n move and the next configuration is the original one except that the threshold changes from ≥p to >p − 1/n. Player !C can indeed choose such an n since p cannot be 0. The intuition is that [p, 1] = n∈N (p − 1/n, 1] so this behaves like a universal quantification.
In move M8, player C can choose such an n since p < 1. The intuition is that a Weak Until with a > threshold is the dual of a Strong Until with a ≥ threshold (based on ¬(φUψ) ≡ (¬ψ)W(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)), so it is like an existential quantification. The next configuration is the original one except the threshold changes from > p to ≥ p + 1/n.
Move M9 is the most complex one. At configuration s, [α] p , C , player C can claim that ψ 2 is true. If she does not do this, player !C can claim that ψ 1 is not true. If none of these happen, player C has to choose a structural element of the model, a sub-distribution d of P(s, ·) that has positive mass, under-approximates the probability distribution P(s, ·), and specifies the re-distribution of promise p into promised probabilities at successor states. If successor s ''contributes'' d(s ) towards the probability of α at s, and p is the probability of α at s , then d(s ) = P(s, s ) · p . Accordingly, when going to the next configuration, the contribution d(s ) is adjusted by multiplying it by P(s, s )
Move M10 behaves like move M9 except that a Bounded Until with bound 0 has to realize ψ 2 right away; a Bounded Weak Until with bound zero has to realize at least one of ψ 1 or ψ 2 right away; and the k is decreased to k − 1 in α if the next configuration does not have a proper sub-formula of α to consider.
In most moves, plays either end or move to configurations with proper sub-formula in the closure. In a configuration with Strong Until with non-strict bound or Weak Until with strict bound, the next configuration changes from non-strict to strict bound or vice versa. In a configuration with Strong Until with strict bound or Weak Until with non-strict bound, the next configuration has the same path formula and threshold type, or has a proper sub-formula.
Thus, all infinite plays end with an infinite suffix of configurations that are
Configurations of these suffixes are either labeled by Strong Until with strict bound or Weak Until with non-strict bound, where the states and the exact probability bound may still change, but where neither the player C nor the sub-formulae ψ 1 and ψ 2 change.
Definition 3 (Acceptance Conditions).
1. Player V wins all infinite plays with an infinite suffix either of type A1 above with C = V, or of type A2 above with C = R. Player R wins all other infinite plays: those with an infinite suffix either of type A1 when C = R, or of type A2 when C = V.
2. Finite plays are won as stipulated in Fig. 5 . In particular, if a player has to make a choice and cannot do so, the other player wins that play.
These are Büchi type acceptance conditions, and so our games are known to be determined [9] . We use the notion of strategy for player C informally. But such strategies contain, for each configuration of a game, at most one set of choices as required by the applicable move from M1-M10.
Example 5. We describe a winning strategy for player , and dynamic value d(s 0 ) = p i −d(s 1 ). A simple calculation shows that as long as player R chooses s 0 as the next state (clearly, if she chooses s 1 she is going to lose as s 1 ∈ L(r)) the promised probability >p i is going to decrease according to the following sequence:
, p 2 = 
We appeal to Lemma 1. We treat sub-formulae ψ 1 and ψ 2 as propositions (respectively, the q and r in that lemma) and annotate states of M by ψ 1 and ψ 2 . By definition of p we have
and so the probability of ψ 1 Uψ 2 in M s k,l at s is greater than p. Player V's strategy is to consider this system M s k,l .
In the case that p = 0, we choose some state t ∈ T such that Prob M 
(t, α) − δ) · P(s, t)).
In case that Prob M s k,l (t, α) ≤ δ we thus have d(t) = 0 (and so effectively remove t from the set T above). As p = t∈S Prob M s k,l (t, α) · P(s, t) and p > 0 there must be at least one state t such that Prob M s k,l (t, α) ≥ p and hence Consider the case that α = ψ 1 Wψ 2 and equals ≥. As before, let p = Prob M (t, α), which equals t∈T P(s, t) · Prob M (t, α). By assumption p ≥ p. Let δ be p − p. For all t ∈ T , let
(s, t)).
In particular, if Prob M (t, α) ≤ δ, then d(t) = 0. This completes the specification of sub-distribution d chosen by player V. 
i.e., the gap between the promise and the actual probability does not decrease.
We now study the consequences of this capability of player R for the different forms of path formula α: Case (c): For bounded operators, as the bound decreases, in a finite number of steps the play moves to configurations of the form s , ψ i , V for i ∈ {1, 2} and so player R wins by induction.
In game G M (s, φ), player V owns initial configuration s, φ, V . For a dual game, with the same moves but with initial configuration s, φ, R , Theorem 2 and its proof then remain to be valid if we swap the role of players in both.
Example 7. Consider game
, where M is as in Fig. 3(a) , and let α = qUr. Thus, either the play is finite and so lost for player V as described above; or the play is infinite and so lost for player V by the acceptance conditions A2 on infinite plays.
We conclude that player R wins that game. A winning strategy for her from the initial configuration only needs to be specified for move M9: H. Fecher 
Winning strategies
Given a winning strategy, it is important to analyze its structure. In general, a strategy may need to memorize the history of the computation. This could lead to strategies with infinite memory requirements, hindering their implementation. In memoryless strategies the next step suggested by the strategy depends only on the current configuration. As the games defined above are a special type of Büchi games, it is obvious that winning can be realized by memoryless strategies. In the Hintikka games defined here, the configuration contains a probability bound and in general the space of possible configurations is continuous. It follows that memoryless strategies are not sufficient for implementability. Therefore, we are searching for additional restrictions on the structure of the strategy that relate to its implementability.
In this section we show that when a player can win game G M (s, φ) she can use winning strategies that are of a specific type. These winning strategies choose structured distributions when revisiting a state in a configuration with a Strong or Weak Until operator. Thus, although strategies manipulate infinite (in fact continuous) objects, the results of this section suggest that it may be possible to finitely represent and use them.
As before, we use the notion of strategy informally. As usual, we say that a play is consistent with a strategy for player C if every move of player C in that play is done as prescribed in that strategy. A strategy is memoryless if the choices of its player depend solely on the current configuration, not on the finite history of configurations that preceded the current one in a play. 
A cyclically monotone strategy is monotone on cyclic paths within single plays: its player can force a decrease or increase of the thresholds depending on the path formula and on whether it is a V or R configuration.
Definition 6 (Cyclically Monotone Strategies).
A strategy σ for player C in game G M (s, φ) is cyclically monotone iff for any two configurations s, [α] p , C and s, [α] p , C that occur in this order on some play consistent with σ , then
The existence of winning strategies implies the existence of winning strategies that are locally monotone and cyclically monotone. (s, φ) , there exists a winning strategy for player C iff there exists a memoryless winning strategy for player C that is also locally monotone and cyclically monotone.
Theorem 3. For every game G M

Proof of Theorem 3.
Assuming that there exists some winning strategy for player C in game G M (s, φ), it suffices to show that a slight modification of the winning strategy synthesized in the proof of Theorem 2 is memoryless, locally monotone, and cyclically monotone. That slightly modified strategy will clearly be memoryless by construction. We now describe this modified winning strategy and first prove its local monotonicity, by induction as in the proof of Theorem 2. Then we prove that it is cyclically monotone.
Modified winning strategy and its local monotonicity. The only configurations where player C needs to make choices are of form s, [α] 
With the latter two, we restrict C's strategy to choose ψ 1 whenever possible and, only when impossible, to choose ψ 2 .
This is similar to what one can do in Hintikka games for first-order logic. We show that the way configurations of the form s, [α] p , C are handled induces a memoryless and monotone strategy.
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If α = Xψ , then the strategy defined in the proof of Theorem 2 chooses the set of successors according to the state s, and is clearly memoryless.
If !C = C and either α = ψ 1 Uψ 2 and = ≥; or α = ψ 1 Wψ 2 and = >, then player C has to choose a value n ∈ N. By choosing the minimal possible n she ensures that the strategy is memoryless.
Consider two configurations
Whenever the play moves to configurations of the form s , ψ i , C for i ∈ {1, 2}, the strategy is memoryless, locally monotone, and cyclically monotone by induction. We start with proving local monotonicity for moves that may choose sub-distributions.
1. For configurations where α = ψ 1 Wψ 2 , α = ψ 1 W ≤k ψ 2 , or α = ψ 1 U ≤k ψ 2 , and C = C we claim that the strategy composed in the proof of Theorem 2 is locally monotone by induction. Intuitively, this can be seen by the strategy using the gap δ between the probability of the formula and the required threshold. The strategy partitions this gap between all successors, so if the same state is visited with different thresholds, the partition of the gap implies that the distribution does not increase. s, t) ).
It follows that if
For the case where α = ψ 1 Uψ 2 and C = C , the strategy as defined in the proof of Theorem 2 is not locally monotone. We modify it as follows: For every configuration s, [ψ 1 Uψ 2 ] >p , C the sub-distribution d is chosen according to the minimal k such that some fraction of Prob M s k (s, α) is greater than p. Intuitively, the fraction is chosen so as to maximize the satisfaction of α as soon as possible. At the same time, in order to ensure both local monotonicity and cyclic monotonicity, we cannot use the full weight of paths that fulfill α fast. This is why, we use the increasing sequence , . . . to take increasing parts of this probability but always leave some leeway to play with to ensure the monotonicity. The exact definition of this fraction is given below. Furthermore, we use the gap between Consider the configuration s, [α] >p , C . We assume, without loss of generality, that s ∈ [|ψ 2 |] M . We measure the exact probability to satisfy α within i steps. For every t ∈ S let
Consider the following increasing sequence: We set d(t) as follows:
It is simple to see that t∈S d(t) > p. Indeed, t∈S d(t) is the sum of the following three expressions: 
so both players do not choose to go to configurations of the form t, ψ i , !C for i ∈ {1, 2}. It follows that Table 1 Sub-formulae that can () or cannot (×) be forced into finite plays by which winning player; ticks in parentheses indicate finite plays after an initial -correction of bounds. Table 1 summarizes which PCTL sub-formulae can always be coerced into finite plays if the winning player plays according to a winning strategy. For example, the truth of a Strong Until with strict bound implies the existence of a winning strategy for Verifier that forces to explore only a finite portion of the game before going to sub-formulae, and similarly from a negated Weak Until with a non-strict bound. To determine whether a PCTL formula is won by means of such finite plays only, we can either convert it into ''GreaterThan'' normal form and check whether each such sub-formula has a negation polarity that corresponds to the desired player in that table, or we can convert it into negation normal form and interpret that table as is on the resulting sub-formulae. As already discussed, one can change the strictness of a threshold bound by slightly changing the required probabilities in the formula. Thus, an -correction may change a formula whose truth does not force finite plays to a formula whose truth does force finite plays. Note that the operator X ≥ does not lead to infinite plays but may lead to using infinite sets of states. she can win at all. Furthermore, if the Markov chain is infinite, the game explores only a finite portion of it. Based on these insights, in subsequent work we study completeness of abstraction of PCTL [10] . Abstractions are finite-state labeled Markov chains A where the labeling function L has type L: AP × S → {0, 1, ⊥} (instead of L: AP → P(S)), there is a notion of satisfaction between PCTL formulae and abstract models A, the abstraction relation (A, a) ≺ (M, s) for countable labeled Markov chains M is a variant of Larsen-Skou probabilistic simulation [11] ; and ''completeness'' means if there is a PCTL formula η for which Verifier can force finite plays in all M, then s ∈ [|η|] M implies there is some abstraction A with state a with (A, a) ≺ (M, s) where (A, a) satisfies η. In [10] , we show that these 3-valued labeled Markov chains and probabilistic simulation cannot render such completeness for all of PCTL and identify a fragment of PCTL for which completeness is achieved. Future work will therefore also attempt to generalize these abstractions A to a kind of tree automata such that we can then secure completeness for the entire logic PCTL.
Discussion
Related work
The results in Lemma 1 are related to the results described in [12] [13] [14] . In [12] , it is shown that in infinite-state Markov chains derived from lossy channel systems, it is possible to approximate the probability of a linear-time property to within a given bound by ''trying'' increasing lengths of channels. Rabinovich also studies lossy channel systems and shows that by considering paths of increasing length it is possible to approximate the probability of a linear-time property [13] . Finally, in [14] , a logic with only the next operator and the threshold > is studied. For such formulae and infinite-state Markov chains, it is shown how to construct a sequence of approximations of the system such that a finite-state approximation satisfies the formula.
In [15] , finite-state (discrete-time) labeled Markov chains and probabilistic CTL (PCTL) are considered in their standard semantics, and different forms of evidence are being developed for documenting the falsity of a PCTL formula in a given state. One form computes those paths that contribute most to the falsity of a formula. Another form computes most probable subtrees to gain more precise diagnostic evidence. Both forms, studied for Strong and Weak Until, are supported with shortest-path type algorithms for computing such evidence.
In [16] , the line of work from [15] is being pushed into the world of Markov decision processes, with a focus on upwards-bounded probability thresholds in PCTL formulae-whereas we study the downwards-bounded case without loss H. Fecher 
et al. / Performance Evaluation ( ) -
of generality. The shortest-path algorithms in [16] are then combined with AND/OR trees in order to filter the computed set of paths to one with high explanatory value, and to compute the probability of that filtered path set. In [17] , bounded model-checking techniques are applied to the generation of counter-examples for probabilistic reachability properties. These techniques are combined with optimizations such as loop-detection to speed up that computation and to contain the size of these counter-example path sets.
In [18] , the soundness of probabilistic counter-examples based on simulation preorders of [19, 20] , represented as finitestate Markov chains, appeals to properties of the possibly infinitely many concretizations of that finite-state Markov chain. An alternative approach is that proposed in [21] , where finite, stochastic, 2-person games G are used as abstractions of Markov decision processes M. These games have a satisfaction relation for PCTL that is sound with respect to abstraction. Therefore, the winning strategies that witness such satisfaction G | φ are guaranteed to transfer into winning strategies that witness the satisfaction M | φ for the model M that G abstracts. This is an incomplete abstraction method in the sense discussed in Section 5 of [21] .
In [22] , a quantitative µ-calculus with an explicit discount operator, and with models whose transitions are labeled with discount factors has non-negative real numbers as results of model checks. Quantitative parity games are developed and shown to correspond to model checks for formulae of the quantitative µ-calculus. However, winning strategies are no longer memoryless in general as they may have to ''make up'' for discount factors encountered en-route in a play-even in games with finite set of configurations.
In [23] , a quantitative µ-calculus (qMµ) is defined over models that contain both non-deterministic and probabilistic choice but no discounting. A denotational semantics generalizing Kozen's familiar one [24] is given. For any finite-state model and formula of qMµ a probabilistic analogue of parity games is given, and the determinacy of this game is shown. It is also proved that its game value equals that of the denotational semantics for the model and formula in question and that there exist memoryless winning strategies.
This paper is a journal version of the paper [25] .
Conclusions
We captured the denotational PCTL semantics over countably labeled Markov chains through Hintikka games with Büchi acceptance conditions. This therefore renders an operational account of truth and falsity of PCTL model checks on such models in terms of winning strategies for the players Verifier and Refuter (respectively). Game moves depend on the strictness or non-strictness of probability thresholds for path formulae. Winning strategies may be assumed to be memoryless and monotone in their choice of structural elements (here sub-distributions). PCTL formulae in ''GreaterThan'' normal form that contain Until operators with a certain combination of threshold type and negation polarity -statically derived from Table 1 -have winning strategies that may be interpreted as a finitary witness of the falsity (respectively, truth) of the formula under consideration.
